By Fr. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco O.P., Catholic Exchange, September 22, 2010
[A GUEST COMMENTARY BY THOMAS SAWYER]
In order to defend the prohibitions against abortion and euthanasia, I believe we must thoroughly explain human personhood. Usually, people who are pro-choice and approve of euthanasia do not see the killing of an embryo or a persistent vegetative state (PVS) patient as the killing of a human person. Although they recognize that these individuals are valuable human beings, they are skeptical of their moral worth and personhood. More specifically, they believe that the embryo or the PVS patient does not deserve the same moral treatment as a normal, autonomous human adult.
In order to address this issue, there have been two main philosophical endeavors. Some scholars, such as John Harris and Peter Singer [1], have researched the requirements of achieving the status of a ‘human person’, which involves a demonstrable set of morally significant characteristics (e.g., cognitive ability, sense of self and time, interest in prolonged existence) and that conforms to dictums against speciesism. [2] Oftentimes, these scholars reduce the meaning of the human being to a biological description, formulating a fundamental distinction between a human being and a human person, and supporting a criterion of personal identity as psychological. [3] Other scholars, such as Christopher Megone and Katerina Markenzini [4], accept the premise of human personhood but argue that moral status comes from the potentiality, not actuality, of persons, describing the unborn and PVS patient as potential persons.
Overall, I believe that the potentiality argument, oftentimes appealed to by pro-life supporters, needs some clarification. Simultaneously, I believe the dualistic thinking seen in scholars is misconstrued regarding how the soul, the organizing principle of life, relates to the body, the biological organism. Both these issues can be resolved by investigation and reflection over the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Here I will focus on the concept of personhood with regards to the bioethics of abortion.
1) Clarification of Potentiality
People may be hesitant to admit that potential persons deserve the same moral treatment as actual persons because they view “potentiality” as a mere contingent possibility or probability. Just because I have the mere possibility or probability to become a professor doesn’t mean that I should be treated as a professor (given a salary and all the employment benefits). However, possibility and probability are not synonymous with the Aristotelian potentiality that the pro-life movement espouses.
Aristotle identifies in De anima that there are certain motions [5] within natural substances, or beings that exist per se, that are acted out by virtue of the substance itself or by virtue of something else. [6] He distinguishes between two different senses of potentiality: (1) the power that a thing has to produce a change (to receive an action or execute an action) [7] (2) the capacity to be in a different and more completed state. [8] Certainly we can see both kinds of dunamis in the zygote. Firstly, the zygote has the power to produce a change, e.g. for cellular division and differentiation. Secondly, the zygote has the capacity to be in a more completed state, namely by becoming an embryo, fetus, infant, adolescent and adult. These changes are both physical and psycho-physical (i.e., mental, emotional) in nature. [9] Both types of potentiality are present in natural beings, and the second type involves the first. Therefore, the second notion of potentiality is the one that concerns the potentiality argument.
2) Potentiality and Actuality
Although the actualization of these innate potentialities may be impeded (e.g., genetic mutation, lack of environmental resources), there is no doubt that cyclical patterns of development and evolution exist in the natural world. By actualizing its potentialities, a member of a species becomes a more perfect member of its species. Still, some people may say that it is one thing to have potential, another to actualize it.
In order to describe this relationship between potentiality and actuality, the two definitions of actuality must be differentiated. In the first sense, actuality is existence (esse) or the ‘state of being’. In the second sense, actuality is an operation or activity, like verbal communication or thinking. For example, someone sleeping is actually alive, although he/she is only potentially awake. Importantly, all potentiality is in reference to an actuality that is prior to it in definition and time. [10] There is no such thing as mere potentiality. [11] Potentialities are always actualized by or within a being. Whereas we can consider an actual person without his/her potentialities (professions, moods, talents, etc), it is not possible to think vice versa. In our language, for something to be buildable or visible (such as a house,) it must be capable of being built or capable of being seen. Identifying a being’s natural potentialities implies a reference to the reality of those actualities as inherent in the natural being.
3) Potentiality of Personhood
The potentiality argument implies that the traditional personhood perspective (a distinction between human persons and human beings) should be rejected on the grounds of potentiality. There can be no potential personhood in a zygote without some reference to the actual personhood in a zygote. In fact, the human zygote should be attributed moral significance because it is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of an adult human form. Moreover, we must be careful not to think that this essential potentiality can be attributed to human gametes (i.e., sperm and eggs) as Peter Singer posits, else we lose several thousand persons to ejaculations and menstrual cycles. [12] The unfertilized egg and sperm cannot be treated as potential persons, not even as potential human beings, because they cannot independently make up a member of the human species genetically (i.e., they are haploid human cells, or gametes, that work towards the making of an organism). Fertilization marks the juncture wherein the gametes perish and each “realizes its material potentiality as the matter in which a new set of essential potentialities, constituting the nature of a different entity, are instantiated”. [13] Thus, the human being must be identified and explained according to its essential potentiality, not its material potentiality.
[THE CONCLUSION OF THIS POST WILL BE PUBLISHED IN TWO WEEKS.]
Thomas Sawyer is a graduate from Saint Michael’s College in VT. He studied biochemistry and philosophy as an undergraduate and is pursuing graduate studies and a career in catholic bioethics. This contribution was lightly edited by Fr. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P.
ENDNOTES
[1] John Harris, The Value of Life (Routledge: London, 1985); Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993) 86-87.
[2] Speciesism is described as having an unwarranted moral bias against all other life forms. Ironically, the avoidance of speciesism has led philosophers to formulate justifications for actions against the human species.
[3] Therefore, we can say that these people think dualistically because they acknowledge a division in natural life between the body and the soul, or psyche, the latter of which conveys moral significance. Typically, dualists believe that the soul is immaterial and separable from the human body. According to them, “I” am the psyche (the thinker), which is distinct from my body (the organism). These thinkers define the: “I” may be present at one point and absent at another from my living organism during its stages of development. To them, all human persons are certainly human beings, but not all human beings are human persons. For this reason, abortion and euthanasia are justifiable on the grounds that there are human beings lacking personhood.
[4] Christopher Megone, “Potentiality and Persons: An Aristotelian Perspective” in Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues. (2000) 155-177; Katerina Markenzini, “A Classic Perspective of the Conception of Personhood: The Moral Significance of Potentiality and Actuality” in International Center of Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research. (2006) 129-143.
[5] This motion is not confined to locomotion, as we often think of in modern physics, but describes any natural change. Aristotle describes this motion as the potentiality (dunamis) of the natural substance.
[6] De anima I, 3 x406a.
[7] Metaphysics, IX, 1, 1046a.
[8] Ibid. 6, 1048a.
[9] I am using this term to describe those interactions between the Aristotelian soul and the body. For example, a feeling of revenge usually enacts ‘the boiling of the blood and heat around the heart’. De anima, I, 1 x403b.
[10] Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1049b.
[11] Actuality is prior to potentiality in substance. Being is capable of not being but not vice versa. Ibid. V, 1019a.
[12] Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, ‘The Moral Status of the Embryo’ in Unsanctifying Human Life, 85.
[13] Christopher Megone (2000) 165. Even standard embryology texts locate the beginning of the human identity, individuality, and substance at fertilization, not at any subsequent stage. We must understand that cells, like gametes, are sub-units of multi-cellular organisms specialized into carrying out particular functions towards the cause of that autonomous organism as a whole.
http://bioethics.catholicexchange.com/2010/09/22/459/
Human Personhood, Potentiality, and the Soul: PART I
By Fr. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco O.P., Catholic Exchange, September 22, 2010
[A GUEST COMMENTARY BY THOMAS SAWYER]
In order to defend the prohibitions against abortion and euthanasia, I believe we must thoroughly explain human personhood. Usually, people who are pro-choice and approve of euthanasia do not see the killing of an embryo or a persistent vegetative state (PVS) patient as the killing of a human person. Although they recognize that these individuals are valuable human beings, they are skeptical of their moral worth and personhood. More specifically, they believe that the embryo or the PVS patient does not deserve the same moral treatment as a normal, autonomous human adult.
In order to address this issue, there have been two main philosophical endeavors. Some scholars, such as John Harris and Peter Singer [1], have researched the requirements of achieving the status of a ‘human person’, which involves a demonstrable set of morally significant characteristics (e.g., cognitive ability, sense of self and time, interest in prolonged existence) and that conforms to dictums against speciesism. [2] Oftentimes, these scholars reduce the meaning of the human being to a biological description, formulating a fundamental distinction between a human being and a human person, and supporting a criterion of personal identity as psychological. [3] Other scholars, such as Christopher Megone and Katerina Markenzini [4], accept the premise of human personhood but argue that moral status comes from the potentiality, not actuality, of persons, describing the unborn and PVS patient as potential persons.
Overall, I believe that the potentiality argument, oftentimes appealed to by pro-life supporters, needs some clarification. Simultaneously, I believe the dualistic thinking seen in scholars is misconstrued regarding how the soul, the organizing principle of life, relates to the body, the biological organism. Both these issues can be resolved by investigation and reflection over the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Here I will focus on the concept of personhood with regards to the bioethics of abortion.
1) Clarification of Potentiality
People may be hesitant to admit that potential persons deserve the same moral treatment as actual persons because they view “potentiality” as a mere contingent possibility or probability. Just because I have the mere possibility or probability to become a professor doesn’t mean that I should be treated as a professor (given a salary and all the employment benefits). However, possibility and probability are not synonymous with the Aristotelian potentiality that the pro-life movement espouses.
Aristotle identifies in De anima that there are certain motions [5] within natural substances, or beings that exist per se, that are acted out by virtue of the substance itself or by virtue of something else. [6] He distinguishes between two different senses of potentiality: (1) the power that a thing has to produce a change (to receive an action or execute an action) [7] (2) the capacity to be in a different and more completed state. [8] Certainly we can see both kinds of dunamis in the zygote. Firstly, the zygote has the power to produce a change, e.g. for cellular division and differentiation. Secondly, the zygote has the capacity to be in a more completed state, namely by becoming an embryo, fetus, infant, adolescent and adult. These changes are both physical and psycho-physical (i.e., mental, emotional) in nature. [9] Both types of potentiality are present in natural beings, and the second type involves the first. Therefore, the second notion of potentiality is the one that concerns the potentiality argument.
2) Potentiality and Actuality
Although the actualization of these innate potentialities may be impeded (e.g., genetic mutation, lack of environmental resources), there is no doubt that cyclical patterns of development and evolution exist in the natural world. By actualizing its potentialities, a member of a species becomes a more perfect member of its species. Still, some people may say that it is one thing to have potential, another to actualize it.
In order to describe this relationship between potentiality and actuality, the two definitions of actuality must be differentiated. In the first sense, actuality is existence (esse) or the ‘state of being’. In the second sense, actuality is an operation or activity, like verbal communication or thinking. For example, someone sleeping is actually alive, although he/she is only potentially awake. Importantly, all potentiality is in reference to an actuality that is prior to it in definition and time. [10] There is no such thing as mere potentiality. [11] Potentialities are always actualized by or within a being. Whereas we can consider an actual person without his/her potentialities (professions, moods, talents, etc), it is not possible to think vice versa. In our language, for something to be buildable or visible (such as a house,) it must be capable of being built or capable of being seen. Identifying a being’s natural potentialities implies a reference to the reality of those actualities as inherent in the natural being.
3) Potentiality of Personhood
The potentiality argument implies that the traditional personhood perspective (a distinction between human persons and human beings) should be rejected on the grounds of potentiality. There can be no potential personhood in a zygote without some reference to the actual personhood in a zygote. In fact, the human zygote should be attributed moral significance because it is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of an adult human form. Moreover, we must be careful not to think that this essential potentiality can be attributed to human gametes (i.e., sperm and eggs) as Peter Singer posits, else we lose several thousand persons to ejaculations and menstrual cycles. [12] The unfertilized egg and sperm cannot be treated as potential persons, not even as potential human beings, because they cannot independently make up a member of the human species genetically (i.e., they are haploid human cells, or gametes, that work towards the making of an organism). Fertilization marks the juncture wherein the gametes perish and each “realizes its material potentiality as the matter in which a new set of essential potentialities, constituting the nature of a different entity, are instantiated”. [13] Thus, the human being must be identified and explained according to its essential potentiality, not its material potentiality.
[THE CONCLUSION OF THIS POST WILL BE PUBLISHED IN TWO WEEKS.]
Thomas Sawyer is a graduate from Saint Michael’s College in VT. He studied biochemistry and philosophy as an undergraduate and is pursuing graduate studies and a career in catholic bioethics. This contribution was lightly edited by Fr. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P.
ENDNOTES
[1] John Harris, The Value of Life (Routledge: London, 1985); Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993) 86-87.
[2] Speciesism is described as having an unwarranted moral bias against all other life forms. Ironically, the avoidance of speciesism has led philosophers to formulate justifications for actions against the human species.
[3] Therefore, we can say that these people think dualistically because they acknowledge a division in natural life between the body and the soul, or psyche, the latter of which conveys moral significance. Typically, dualists believe that the soul is immaterial and separable from the human body. According to them, “I” am the psyche (the thinker), which is distinct from my body (the organism). These thinkers define the: “I” may be present at one point and absent at another from my living organism during its stages of development. To them, all human persons are certainly human beings, but not all human beings are human persons. For this reason, abortion and euthanasia are justifiable on the grounds that there are human beings lacking personhood.
[4] Christopher Megone, “Potentiality and Persons: An Aristotelian Perspective” in Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues. (2000) 155-177; Katerina Markenzini, “A Classic Perspective of the Conception of Personhood: The Moral Significance of Potentiality and Actuality” in International Center of Philosophy and Inter-Disciplinary Research. (2006) 129-143.
[5] This motion is not confined to locomotion, as we often think of in modern physics, but describes any natural change. Aristotle describes this motion as the potentiality (dunamis) of the natural substance.
[6] De anima I, 3 x406a.
[7] Metaphysics, IX, 1, 1046a.
[8] Ibid. 6, 1048a.
[9] I am using this term to describe those interactions between the Aristotelian soul and the body. For example, a feeling of revenge usually enacts ‘the boiling of the blood and heat around the heart’. De anima, I, 1 x403b.
[10] Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1049b.
[11] Actuality is prior to potentiality in substance. Being is capable of not being but not vice versa. Ibid. V, 1019a.
[12] Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, ‘The Moral Status of the Embryo’ in Unsanctifying Human Life, 85.
[13] Christopher Megone (2000) 165. Even standard embryology texts locate the beginning of the human identity, individuality, and substance at fertilization, not at any subsequent stage. We must understand that cells, like gametes, are sub-units of multi-cellular organisms specialized into carrying out particular functions towards the cause of that autonomous organism as a whole.
http://bioethics.catholicexchange.com/2010/09/22/459/